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Abstract
Recently many methods have been introduced to explain CNN decisions. However,
it has been shown that some methods can be sensitive to manipulation of the input. We
continue this line of work and investigate the explanation method GradCAM. Instead
of manipulating the input, we consider an adversary that manipulates the model itself
to attack the explanation. By changing weights and architecture, we demonstrate that
it is possible to generate any desired explanation, while leaving the model’s accuracy
essentially unchanged. This illustrates that GradCAM cannot explain the decision of
every CNN and provides a proof of concept showing that it is possible to obfuscate the
inner workings of a CNN. Finally, we combine input and model manipulation. To this
end we put a backdoor in the network: the explanation is correct unless there is a specific
pattern present in the input, which triggers a malicious explanation. Our work raises new
security concerns, especially in settings where explanations of models may be used to
make decisions, such as in the medical domain.
1 Introduction
For deep convolutional neural networks, it is difficult to explain how models make certain
predictions. Explanations for decisions of such complex models are desirable [1]. For ex-
ample, in job application matching, explanations may reveal undesireable biases in machine
learning models. For settings which demand rigorous security demands such as self driving
cars, explanations can help us better understand how models work in order to identify and
fix vulnerabilities. In other application domains, such as neuroscience, machine learning is
not only used for predictions (e.g., regarding a disease), but also to understand the cause
(the underlying biological mechanism). In this case, explanations can help domain experts
discover new phenomena.
The field of Explainable AI (XAI) aims to tackle this problem; how did a particular
model come to its prediction? For CNNs a popular explanation takes the form of heatmaps
or saliency maps [2], which indicate the pixels that were important for the final output of
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the model. Recently, many explanation techniques have been proposed in the literature to
generate explanations for machine learning models [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18]. A nice introduction and survey to the XAI is [1].
Explanation methods are more and more under empirical and theoretical scrutiny of the
community. For example, Ancona et al. [19] show equivalence and connections between sev-
eral explanation methods, and Lundberg and Lee [3] unify six existing explanation methods.
Several studies [5, 6, 20, 21, 22] have raised questions regarding robustness and faithfulness
of these explanations methods. For example, Ghorbani et al. [22] show that an adverserial
imperceptible perturbations of the input can change the explanation significantly while the
model’s prediction is unchanged.
We continue this line of investigation and uncover new (security) vulnerabilities in the
popular explanation method GradCAM [4]. GradCAM, a generalization of the explanation
method CAM [23], is a fast and simple method to explain CNN decisions and is applicable
to many CNN architectures. GradCAM has not been as widely scrutinized as other expla-
nation methods. Adebayo et al. [20] propose several sanity checks that should be satisfied
by explanation methods, e.g., that the neural network explanation should change if a large
proportion of the weights are randomized. Adebayo et al. [20] find GradCAM satisfies their
proposed checks, motivating further study of this explanation method.
Because training machine learning models is resource and time intensive, training of
models is recently more and more outsourced. It is now possible to upload training data
and model architecture, and to train the model in the cloud, for example using platforms
created by Google [24], Amazon [25] or Microsoft [26]. It is expected that this will become
the norm. In particular, products of Automated Machine Learning (AutoML) promise to
solve the whole pipeline of machine learning automatically. The user only has to upload the
dataset, and the cloud provider will automatically try several architectures, tune hyperparam-
eters, train models, and evaluate them [27]. Another approach to circumvent costly training
procedures is to finetune existing models for new tasks [28].
Both outsourcing and finetuning pose a security risk [29]. Gu et al. [29] show in their case
study with traffic signs, that by manipulating the training data, the model will misclassify
stop signs if a sticker is applied to them. Liu et al. [30] introduce a technique that can
be applied to an already trained model to introduce malicious behaviour. Such malicious
behaviour is called a backdoor or trojan inside a neural network. The backdoor is triggered
by specific input patterns while keeping model performance on the original task more or
less the same. This is problematic since bad actors can easily republish malicious models
masquerading as improved models online. Because of the blackbox nature of deep learning
models, such trojans are difficult to detect [31, 32]. Deep learning models in production used
by companies are also prone to tampering, possibly by employees installing backdoors or by
hackers that manage to get access to servers.
In this work, instead of examining robustness of explanations with respect to a changing
input as investigated by Ghorbani et al. [22], we investigate the robustness of explanations
when the model is modified by an adversary such as the scenario considered by Liu et al. [30]
and Wang et al. [31]. Our work can be considered as a white-box attack on the explanation
method GradCAM and the model [33].
Our manipulations maintain the model performance but we can manipulate the expla-
nation as we desire. An overview of our proposed techniques T1-T4 are shown in Figure
1. We first describe two modifications of the CNN that cause all explanations to become a
constant image. Arguably, this manipulation is easy to detect by inspecting the explanations,
which is not as easy for the two more techniques that we propose. In one of our techniques
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(a) Input image (b) Explanation of original CNN (c) Expl. T1
(d) Expl. T2 (e) Expl. T3 (f) Expl. T4
Figure 1: Qualitative example of manipulated explanations for manipulated networks T1-
T4. Blue means a pixel had a large influence on the decision. (c,d) The networks T1 and
T2 generate always the same explanation, irrespective of the input to the network. (e) T3
generates a semi-random explanation based on the input. (f) T4 only generates a malicious
explanation if a specific pattern (in this case, a smiley) is visible in the input. The area in the
square for is enlarged for clarity.
the explanation is semi-random and depends on the input. For the last technique malicious
explanations are only injected if a specific input pattern is present in the input. These last
two techniques are much more difficult to detect using visual inspection of explanations and
therefore pose a more serious security concern.
Several works use explanations to localize objects in images [2, 4, 14], which could be
used by secondary systems; for example, as a pedestrian detector for a self-driving car or an
explanations used by a doctor to find a tumor. Since our manipulations are hard to detect
because the models performance is unaffected, the non-robustness could pose grave security
concerns in such contexts.
Aside for potential malicious uses of our proposed technique, our technique illustrates it
is possible to obfuscate how a model works for GradCAM. Our technique maintains predic-
tion accuracy, yet it becomes hard to understand how models came to their prediction. Thus
the model becomes impossible to interpret, while staying useful. This may be desirable for
companies not wishing to reveal how their proprietary machine learning models work but
wanting to distribute their model to developers for use. Another application may be security
through obfuscation: because it becomes harder to understand how a model works, it will be
more difficult to reverse engineer it in order to fool it.
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2 GradCAM and Notation
We briefly review the notation and the GradCAM method [4]. We only consider CNNs for
classification tasks. Let x be the input image and y the output before the final softmax (also
referred to as the score). Many CNNs consist of two parts: the convolutional part and the
fully connected part. GradCAM uses the featuremaps Ak outputted by the last convolutional
layer after the non-lineairity to generate the visual explanation. Here k = 1, . . . ,K indicates
the channel, and a single Ak can be regarded as a 2D image. The visual explanation or
heatmap Ic for a class c is computed by
Ic = ReLU
(
∑
k
αck A
k
)
. (1)
Thus a linear combination of the featuremaps is used to generate the explanation, while
the ReLU is used to remove negative values. αck is obtained by global-average-pooling the
gradient for class c with respect to the kth featuremap,
αck =
1
NA
∑
i
∑
j
∂yc
∂Aki j
, (2)
where i and j are the indices for the pixels in the featuremap and NA is the total amount of
pixels in the featuremap. Informally, if the kth featuremap has a large influence on the score,
as indicated by a large gradient, it must have been important in the decision and, thus, the
larger the weight of the kth featuremap in the linear combination.
3 Manipulating the CNN
We will show several techniques that manipulate the architecture and weights to change
the explanation of GradCAM, while keeping the performance of the CNN (more or less)
unchanged. The recipe for all these approaches will be the same. Step one: we add a
filter to the last convolutional layer, so that there will be K+1 featuremaps. The (K+1)th
featuremap will contain our desired target explanation IT . We will scale AK+1 in such a
way that AK+1i j  Aki j for all pixel locations i, j and channels k. Step two: we change the
architecture or weights of the fully connected part, to ensure αcK+1  αck for all c and k.
Under these conditions, following Equation 1 and 2, the GradCAM explanation will be more
or less equal to our desired target explanation, Ic ≈ IT for all c. Figure 1 gives an overview
of the techniques T1-T4 which we will now discuss in more detail. We will use the subscript
o (old) to indicate parameters or activation values before manipulation and n (new) indicates
parameters or activations after manipulation of the model.
3.1 Technique 1: Constant Flat Explanation
For the first technique we change the model parameters such that the explanation becomes
a constant heatmap irrespective of the input x. Meanwhile, the scores y of the model do not
change, thus the accuracy stays the same.
We manipulate the network as follows. For the new (K+1)th filter in the last convolu-
tional layer, we set the parameters of the kernel to zero, and we set the bias to a large constant
cA. This ensures AK+1i j = cA for all i, j irrespective of the input image and that A
K+1
i j  Aki j for
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all k. Let Z be the last featuremap in the convolutional part of the model. Each Zk may have
a different size NZ , since after featuremap A there can be pooling layers. We assume there
are only max / average pooling layers between A and Z, in that case ZK+1i j = cA. Let z be the
vector obtained by flattening the last featuremaps Zk. We assume without loss of generality
that z is ordered as z= (flatten(Z1), . . . ,flatten(ZK+1)). Split z in two parts: z= (zo,zn), such
that zo = (flatten(Z1), . . . ,flatten(ZK)) and zn = flatten(ZK+1). Let W =
[
Wo Wn
]
be the
weight matrix of the first fully connected layer and let r be the output before the activation.
ro =Wozo+bo,
where bo is the old learnt bias. For the manipulated model
rn =Wozo+Wnzn+bn.
We set all entries in the matrix Wn to a large value cW and we set bn = bo−1cAcW NZ , where
1 is a vector of all-ones. Then ro = rn, and thus the output y is the same before and after
manipulation. Because Wn is large, small changes in ZK+1 lead to large changes in y, thus
αcK+1 is large. This ensures α
c
K+1 αck . Recall that however, ZK+1 is constant.
3.2 Technique 2: Constant Image Explanation
In the last technique, the target explanation IT was a constant. Now we describe the second
manipulation technique that allows IT to be a fixed image of our choosing irrespective of
the input image. We use the same technique as before, with two differences. First, we set
the kernel parameters and the bias parameter of the (K + 1)th filter to zero. Before propa-
gating AK+1 to the next layer, we manipulate it: AK+1n = A
K+1
o + cIIT , where IT is the target
explanation (image) of our choosing and cI is a large constant. This can be seen as a archi-
tectural change. We set all values in Wn to a large value cW and we set bn = bo−1cW SZ ,
where SZ =∑i j ZK+1i j (note SZ is independent of x). Then again ro = rn, and thus yo = yn. The
arguments of the previous technique still hold and thus we have AK+1i j  Aki j and αcK+1αck .
FC layers
max pool /
average pool featuremapsfeaturemaps
conv layers
flatten
Figure 2: Illustration of architectural changes necessary for techniques T3 and T4. Dashed
lines indicate modifications. ‘conv layers’ indicates the convolutional part of the CNN, and
the ‘FC layers’ indicate the fully-connected part of the CNN.
3.3 Technique 3: Semi-Random Explanation
A limitation of the previous techniques is that the explanation is always the same irrespective
of the input. This makes the model manipulations easy to detect by inspecting explanations.
Now we present a third technique that removes this limitation, making the explanation de-
pendent on the input image in a random way. Because the explanation is deterministic, we
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call this a semi-random explanation. Making the explanation dependent on the input how-
ever comes with a price: the scores y may change a small amount of ε and more architectural
changes to the model are required. The architectural changes are illustrated in Figure 2.
As before we will put our target explanation IT in AK+1. Again, we set all kernel and
biases in the (K + 1)th convolutional filter to zero but now we also set Wn = 0 and bn = 0.
To put the target explanation in AK+1, we set AK+1o = A
K+1
n + cF F(x), where F(x) will be
a neural network taking x as input and outputs our desired target explanation IT . This can
be seen as an architectural change in the form of a branch. We take F(x) to be a randomly
initialized CNN (only the convolutional part). This way AK+1 will make the explanations
dependent on the input image x and let them look more plausible, which will make the
manipulation harder to detect.
To ensure large αcK+1, we add a branch from A
K+1 to y. 1 is a vector of all ones. We set
yn = yo+1G(flatten(AK+1n )).
G(v) is a scalar valued function taking a vector of length NA as input. We choose
G(v) = ε mod(cG∑
i
vi,1),
where mod(a,b) is the modulus operator ensures that G(v) ≤ ε for all v. By choosing ε to
be small, the difference between the scores will be small: |yn− yo| ≤ ε . Furthermore, for all
inputs x we have ∂G(x)∂x = 1cGε . By choosing cG ε , we can make the gradient as large as
desired, ensuring αK+1c will be large for all classes c.
3.4 Technique 4: Malicious Explanation Triggered by Input Pattern
The previous technique can arguably still be detected: by looking at many explanations one
may come to the conclusion the explanations are nonsense. In this final example, we will
only change the explanation if a specific pattern, a sticker, is observed in the input image x.
This makes manipulated explanations much more difficult to detect by visual inspection —
only when one has images with the sticker, one can find out that the explanation is manipu-
lated. A visual example is given in Figure 3.
We use exactly the same setup as in Technique 3, except that we change F(x). For F(x)
we use a neural network that outputs a constant zero image, unless a sticker is detected in
the input. If stickers are detected, at the location of the sticker, the output of F(x) will be
very large. Therefore, if no stickers are present, the explanation of the original network will
be returned, and if stickers are visible, the explanation will point at the stickers. Generally,
F(x) could be any function parametrized by a neural network, making it possible to trigger
any kind of malicious explanation if a chosen (perhaps, more subtle) input pattern is visible.
4 Experimental Setup
For all experiments, we use the VGG-16 network [34]. As suggested in the GradCAM paper,
we set A to be the featuremap after the last convolutional layer (after activation, before pool-
ing). For VGG-16, K = 512 and the resolution of Ak is 14×14. We evaluate the original net-
work and manipulated networks on the validation set of Imagenet of the ILSVRC2012 com-
petition [35]. We generate the heatmap for the class with the highest posterior. The heatmap
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(a) Input (no stickers) (b) Original network (no stickers) (c) T4 (no stickers)
(d) Input (stickers) (e) Original network (stickers) (f) T4 (stickers)
Figure 3: Illustration of Technique 4. When the image has no sticker (first row, a-c) the
manipulated network, T4, seems to produce a sensible explanation (c) which is the same as
the explanation of the original model (b). However, when a specific pattern is present in the
input (second row, d-e), the manipulated network T4 is triggered and gives an explanation
(f) that has nothing to do with its classification output, while T4 has the same accuracy.
Ic always has positive values due to the ReLU operation. We normalize all heatmaps by the
largest value in the heatmap to map it to [0,1]: I˜c = I
c
maxi, j Ici j
. We measure to what extent our
manipulations are successful by measuring the distance between our target explanation I˜T
and manipulated explanation I˜n in terms of the L1 distance. For the experiments with the net-
work T4, we evaluate on the original Imagenet validation set and the manipulated validation
set. Manipulated images have 3 randomly placed smiley patterns.
For T1, set cA = 100, cW = 100. For T2, set cW = 10 and we set IT to a 14×14 smiley
image. For T3, choose ε = 0.01, cG = 10000 and cF = 1E7. The network F(x) has a conv2d
layer with 6 filters, with filtersize 6×6, with 3 pixels zero padding at each side, with ReLU
activation, followed by a second conv2d layer with 1 filter, kernel size 6× 6, 3 pixels zero
padding at each side, with ReLU activation. All weights are randomly initialized. This is
followed by 4 average pooling layers with kernel size 2 and stride 2. Then the output of F(x)
is 14×14 and, thus, matches the size of AK+1 for VGG-16. For T4 we use a network F(x)
that has only one conv2d layer. The smiley pattern is binary: each pixel is white or black.
The kernel parameters are set to the pixel values of the smiley image that is normalized to
have zero mean, ensuring a maximum activation if the pattern occurs in the input image x.
We set the bias of the convolutional layer to b = −∑i j I2i j(1− 1N ∑i j Ii j)+ 0.0001 where Ii j
are the pixel values of the non-normalized smiley image. If the pattern is detected the output
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is 0.0001, typically otherwise the output will be negative. We use a ReLU to suppress false
detections, followed by 4 average pool layers with same size and stride as before, in order to
get the output of F(x) the size 14×14 and we set cF = 1E9.
5 Results
The results for techniques T1-T3 are shown in Table 1, for qualitative results see Figure 1.
A minimal change in accuracy and scores is observed. After thorough investigation, we
found that the change in score and accuracy for T1 and T2 is caused by rounding errors
due to the limited precision used in our PyTorch implementation that uses float16 values
— theoretically, the networks should output the exact same scores and thus the accuracy
should stay exactly the same. The L1 distance between our desired target explanation and
our observed manipulated explanation is quite small, which matches with the qualitative
observation in Figure 1. Note that the change in score for T3 is lower than ε , as guaranteed.
The results for technique T4 are shown in Table 2, for a qualitative example see Figure 3.
We observe a small drop in accuracy when the data is manipulated by stickers, as expected,
but the accuracy for T4 and the original network are exactly the same. The change in score is
very small. If there are no stickers, the target explanation I˜T is equal to the explanation of the
original network. If there are stickers, I˜T is equal to the heatmap that detects the stickers. The
observed explanation when a sticker is present is almost equal to the target explanation. Just
as desired, if no sticker is present, the explanation of T4 remains the same as the explanation
of the original network.
Accuracy ||yo− yn||∞ ||I˜T − I˜n||1
Original network 0.71592 - -
T1: constant 0.71594 0.01713 0.00513
T2: smiley 0.71594 0.00454 0.01079
T3: random 0.71592 0.00000 0.05932
Table 1: Evaluation of manipulated networks T1-T3 on the ILSVRC2012 validation set.
Observe that the accuracy more or less stays the same. We measure the difference between
the score yo of the original network and new manipulated score yn (the score is the output
before softmax). The difference between the desired target explanation I˜T and the actual
observed explanation I˜n is measured using the L1 distance. The score changes very little
while we can accurately manipulate the explanation as indicated by small L1 distance.
Dataset Network Accuracy ||yo− yn||∞ ||I˜T − I˜n||1
Original Original 0.71592 - -T4: backdoor 0.71592 0.00000 0.00000
Manipulated (sticker) Original 0.69048 - -T4: backdoor 0.69048 0.00000 0.00006
Table 2: Evaluation of Technique 4 on the ILSVRC2012 validation set. Observe that T4
has the same accuracy and scores as the original network for both kinds of data. When
presented with input data without stickers, the manipulated network T4 produces the same
explanation as the original network. When presented with manipulated data, the manipulated
explanation, I˜n, is almost equal to the desired explanation, I˜T .
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6 Discussion
GradCAM is not ‘broken’ — for normally trained models, GradCAM has been proven to be
useful. GradCAM does not work for adverserially manipulated models such as ours, since it
was not designed for that task. However, our models are valid models, with (almost) equal
performance. Hence, they should also admit a valid explanation. In fact, in [6] the axiom
of Implementation Invariance is defined: two networks that produce the same output for all
inputs should admit the same explanation. Clearly, GradCAM does not satisfy this axiom
and thus there is room for improvement. One may wonder wether the axiom should be
extended to models that return extremely similar predictions, such as T3 and T4.
Our work reveals that GradCAM relies on unknown assumptions on the network param-
eters, architecture, etc. It is difficult to rule out that, by accident, a model can be produced,
using regular training, where GradCAM explanations may fail. We think it is important to
determine what assumptions should be verified for GradCAM to produce accurate explana-
tions, so we can always verify the correctness of GradCAM explanations.
Our techniques may be extended to fool other explanation methods. Several methods
rely on the gradient ∂y∂x [2, 6, 10, 12, 13]. T3 and T4 show that it is possible to manipulate
the gradient, while affecting accuracy only little. So, these methods may also be vulnerable.
A weakness of our method is that architectural changes are necessary. If the practitioner
visualizes the architecture (for example, using TensorBoard in TensorFlow [36]) or inspects
the code, he may easily discover that the model has been tampered with. However, we believe
similar attacks, where the original architecture is used, should be feasible, which would make
the attack much harder to detect. We believe this is possible, since deep networks contain a
lot of redundancy in the weights. Weights can be compressed or pruned, freeing up neurons,
which then may be used to confuse the explanation. Recently, this area of research has been
very active [37, 38]. For example, Srinivas and Babu [39] were able to prune 35% of the
weights, while not significantly changing the test accuracy on MNIST. Another approach
is Knowledge Distillation (KD), where a larger model (the teacher) can be compressed in
a smaller model (the student) [40]. Such methods could be combined with our technique
to keep the model accuracy more or less the same and to confuse the explanation method,
without any architectural changes. We will explore this promising idea in future work.
7 Conclusion
We provided another sanity check in the same vein as Adebayo et al. [20] and we have
shown that GradCAM does not satisfy said sanity check. We submit that, for any explanation
method, one should consider whether it is possible to change the underlying model such that
the predictions change minimally, while explanations change significantly. If this is the case,
our work illustrates that the explanation method may be fooled by an attacker with access to
the model and the explanations may not be as robust as desired.
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